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PRISON INMATE MARRIAGES: A SURVEY AND A PROPOSAL
I. INTRODUCTION*
During the last century, the individual convicted for a crime lost not
only his freedom but also most of his civil rights:
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of
freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have
some rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but
not the rights of freemen. They are the slaves of the State . . ..
This nineteenth century philosophy has to a large degree carried over to
the twentieth century,2 but there is a movement under way to restore the
prisoner to the status of full citizenship: "Prisoners retain all the rights of
free citizens except those on which restriction is necessary to assure their
orderly confinement or to provide reasonable protection for the rights and
physical safety of all members of the prison community."3
This comment explores one facet of the issue of inmate civil rights: the
right to marry. An analysis will be made of the current situation nation-
wide with particular emphasis on Virginia, including proposed guidelines
for Virginia's Department of Corrections that reflect the current national
trend with regard to inmate marriages.
II. THE INMATE'S "RIGHT" TO MARRY
Incarceration, by its very nature, brings about the curtailment or aboli-
tion of many rights that the free citizen enjoys.4 To determine the effect
imprisonment has on the right to marry, it is necessary to first explore the
current status of inmate rights in general and consider a survey of the
civilian's and the inmate's right to marry.
An inmate does not lose all his rights when convicted and incarcerated.
Generally, "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
* The student contributors are Jackson M. Bruce, John M. Claytor, and Herman C. Daniel
III. Thanks are extended to Hullihen Williams Moore, LL.B., Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent
and Chappell, Richmond, Va., Doris R. Dehart, Chairman, Virginia Board of Corrections and
Rev. George F. Ricketts, Exec. Dir., Chaplain Service of the Churches of Virginia for sharing
their time, thoughts and material on this subject.
1. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
2. See Note, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND). L. Rxv. 929
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Consequences].
3. A.B.A. Joint Comm. on the Legal Status of Prisoners, The Legal Status of Prisoners
(Tent. Draft 1977), in 14 AM. CRIM. L. Rxv. 377, 387 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Legal
Status of Prisoners].
4. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."5 In
actuality, by "implication" or through civil death or disability statutes,'
most jurisdictions have severely curtailed inmate rights, except those pro-
tected by the courts.
In determining which rights to protect, the courts are practical and
realize that the very nature of incarceration is going to restrict many rights
fundamental to and exercisable in civilian life. Accordingly, in fundamen-
tal areas such as certain first amendment rights of speech and association,
the Court has allowed state regulation as long as it is reasonable, consist-
ent with the inmate's status as a prisoner, and within the legitimate
operational considerations of the prison.7
There are areas, however, in which the courts recognize that the rights
involved are so fundamental or the classification is of such a suspect nature
that state regulation must be held to a higher degree of judicial scrutiny.
Accordingly, when the right of reasonable access to the courts,8 or racial
discrimination,9 or certain other rights to speech and association"0 are the
issue: "Only a compelling state interest centering about prison security,
or a clear and present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some
5. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
6. For a discussion of civil disability statutes see Collateral Consequences, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 97 S.Ct. 2532 (1977), recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court, is the latest in this line of decisions. In North Carolina Prison-
ers' Union, the North Carolina Department of Corrections prohibited inmates from soliciting
other inmates to join the union, barred all meetings of the union, and refused to deliver
packets of union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribu-
tion among the prisoners. The union sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief alleg-
ing that its rights, and those of its members, to engage in protected free speech, association
and assembly activities were being infringed by the no-solicitation and no-meeting rules. The
State argued that the union activity would increase tensions between the inmates and prison
personnel and might result in work stoppages, riots, and chaos. A three-judge federal district
court granted the union substantial relief but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that: "An
examination of the potential restrictions on speech or association that have been imposed by
the regulations under challenge, demonstrate that the restrictions imposed are reasonable,
and are consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners and with the legitimate operational
considerations of the institution." 97 S.Ct. at 2540.
North Carolina Prisoners' Union should have no detrimental effect on the issue of inmate
marriages. Whether or not an inmate has a right to marry was not an issue in the case.
Furthermore, it is questionable if the right to marry can be denied by a penal institution using
the test cited above, i.e., that the denial is reasonable and consistent with the inmate's status
as a prisoner and with legitimate operational considerations of the institution.
8. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1241 (2d Cir. 1972); Paka v. Manson, 387
F. Supp. 111, 127 (D. Conn. 1974).
9. See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
10. See, e.g., Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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substantial interference with orderly institutional administration can jus-
tify curtailment of a prisoner's constitutional rights.""
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that marriage,
although not mentioned in the United States Constitution, underlies the
purposes of the Constitution and is, therefore, a basic liberty afforded
constitutional protection.'" Whether a civilian has a constitutionally guar-
anteed right to marry, however, has not been addressed by the Supreme
Court in the absence of other constitutional issues. The weight of authority
in the lower federal courts, though, is that, for the civilian, marriage is a
fundamental right.' 3
The fact that marriage is a fundamental right, or at least a basic liberty,
for a civilian does not, however, preclude governmental intervention. It is
recognized that the power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function
retained by the States.'4 Accordingly, it has been determined that the state
has the power to regulate marital inception, status, duration, and termina-
tion,'" as long as it does so within constitutional bounds.
The Court determines the limits of governmental intervention through
the use of the "strict scrutiny" test, invoked whenever a "fundamental"
right is curtailed by regulations or a "suspect" classification results in
detriment to members of a particular class.'" This test is two-pronged and
places the burden on the state to prove that the regulation is necessary due
to a compelling state interest and that the infringement is the least objec-
tionable alternative available. 7
11. Id. at 904.
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concerning abortions); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating filing fees in order to bring an action for divorce); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation statute); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concerning right to marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down statute providing for sterilization of habitual criminals).
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 969-71 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Redhail
v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (E.D. Wisc. 1976); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821,
822-23 (M.D. Tenn. 1972). Contra, Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298, 299-300 (N.D. Ohio
1972).
14. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205
(1888).
15. See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888); Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 87 A.2d 403 (1952); Toler v. Oakwood Smoke-
less Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364 (1939).
16. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (right to vote and freedom of association); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964) (race).
17. See, e.g., Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 384 N.E.2d 537, 543
(1976).
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In light of the fundamental right involved and the burden of proof on
the state under the strict scrutiny test, the decision in O'Neill v. Dent18 is
not surprising. Dennis O'Neill was expelled from the United States Mer-
chant Marine Academy when it was discovered that he had married in
violation of Academy and federal regulations forbidding a midshipman to
marry while enrolled in the Academy. 9 O'Neill sought declaratory and
injunctive relief alleging that the regulations were a denial of due process
and equal protection and an interference with his fundamental right to
marry. 0 The federal district court decided that, in view of the fundamental
nature of the right involved, the strict scrutiny test should be applied. The
court then ruled that, under this test, the Government had failed to dem-
onstrate the compelling necessity for interfering with the midshipman's
right to marry.2
The courts have not been persuaded to apply the strict scrutiny test seen
in O'Neill when an inmate is one of the parties who is denied permission
to marry. Johnson v. Rockefeller2 involved a conflict between a civil death
statute23 and a life-term inmate's desire to marry. The inmate sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief alleging that the ban on marriage was viola-
tive of his constitutional rights.24 A three-judge federal court held two to
one that the basic essentials of marriage-cohabitation, sexual intercourse,
and the begetting of children-are already effectively denied to prisoners
serving life terms by virtue of their incarceration.2 Thus, the court con-
cluded that a statute merely imposing denial of the right to a formal
marriage ceremony and not denying the basic essentials of marriage did
not violate the equal protection or due process provisions of the Constitu-
tion.2 The court also held that under the eighth amendments the states
18. 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
19. Id. at 567, n.2, citing U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Reg. 02120 (1971), amending
Midshipman Reg. 900.45 (1967): "A midshipman who shall marry shall immediately submit
his resignation. A midshipman found to be married and to have willfully concealed the fact
will be dismissed." Id. n.3, citing 46 C.F.R. § 310.53 (1972): "(c) Marriage. A candidate must
be unmarried and have never been married. Any cadet who shall marry, or who shall be found
to be married, or to have been married before his final graduation shall be required to resign.
Refusal to resign will result in dismissal."
20. 364 F. Supp. at 567-68.
21. Id. at 579.
22. 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub noma. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974).
23. N.Y. CIVIL RIGmS LAW § 79, 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1972).
24. Statute challenged as being violative of the fifth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amend-
ments as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 365 F. Supp. at 380.
25. Id. at 380.
26. Id.
27. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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have considerable freedom "in determining what form the punishment for
crime shall take." ' Thus, the court concluded that the deprivation of the
right to marry is within the state's power to punish crime.
The federal judge dissenting in Johnson, however, was more in line with
the reasoning of the court in O'Neill. He felt that the statute deprived the
inmate of the "critical emotional support to be found in the formalized and
symbolic relation [marriage] itself."2 Furthermore, he postulated that
the "formalized emotional commitment"3 between husband and wife had
been prohibited "without any compelling necessity and without benefiting
the state" 3' and in this sense the punishment could be considered excessive
under the eighth amendment.32
In re Goalen is even more indicative of the plight of the inmate's right
to marry. Ann Goalen was denied permission to marry an inmate of the
Utah prison system by the prison warden acting under the authority of a
civil death statute.34 Her petition for mandate to order the warden to
permit her to marry the prisoner was denied and appealed to the Supreme
Court of Utah. Goalen based her appeal on the concept that marriage is a
fundamental right, denial of which is unconstitutional.35 The Utah Su-
preme Court ruled that this contention was an ipse dixit,3" that the right
to marry is not a fundamental right, and that the state had the authority
to deny inmate marriages under its police power.37
28. 365 F. Supp. at 380.
29. Id. at 382.
30. Id. at 383.
31. Id.
32. Id. (But "excessiveness" alone would not trigger the application of the eight amend-
ment).
33. 30 Utah 2d 27, 512 P.2d 1028 (1973).
34. Id. at 1028. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-36 (1953) provided: "A sentence of imprisonment
in the state prison for any term less than for life suspends all civil rights of the person so
sentenced during imprisonment, and forfeits all private trusts and public offices, authority
of power."
Upon this statute, the Utah State Board of Corrections issued Policy No. 36: "It shall be
the policy of the Board of Corrections that the Warden may, upon recommendation of the
treatment team, authorize inmates nearing their release dates to marry." In re Goalen, 414
U.S. 1148, 1149 (1974).
35. 512 P.2d at 1028.
36. "He himself said it; a bare assertion resting on the authority of an individual." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 961 (4th ed. 1968).
37. 512 P.2d at 1028-30. The attitude of the court toward this case can be ascertained from
the following quotation:
[O]ne of the principals [Ann Goalen] has her civil rights, perhaps, but the other [the
inmate] has lost his because the state, under its legitimate police power, has a perfect
right, in our opinion, to protect the community against the repeated incursions into
1978]
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Appeal was made from the decision in this case to the United States
Supreme Court but certiorari was denied" for want of a substantial federal
question (perhaps because Utah repealed its civil death statute39 and
mooted the issue). However, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Doug-
las and Brennan, dissented and noted, "[tihe extent to which this right
[to marry] may be diluted for one in prison is something the Court has
never decided."40 Mr. Justice Stewart further alluded to the determination
that the Court would have made had certiorari been granted:
In this case the State asserts no security or discipline problems that would
arise by permitting the marriage. The State's only interest appears to be to
utilize the wholesale denial and subsequent "gradual return" of prisoners'
civil rights as an incentive to encourage their cooperation in corrective pro-
grams . . . . I think there is a serious question whether this state policy is
sufficient to overcome the appellant's constitutional claim.'
The decisions in Johnson and In re Goalen have not settled the issue of
the inmate's right to marry. It should be noted that Johnson and In re
Goalen both involved civil death statutes. In those states where the legisla-
ture has not spoken on the issue, it remains to be seen if administrative
officials and courts can deny inmate marriages without legislative author-
ity to do so.
Respected legal organizations, cognizant of the fact that denial of funda-
mental rights such as marriage and voting do not enhance prison security,
discipline, or rehabilitative programs, are drafting proposals calling for the
restoration of many lost rights. The Joint Committee on the Legal Status
of Prisoners, a committee of the American Bar Association, has prepared
an unannotated tentative draft 2 proposing sweeping changes which:
"[Flor the most part . . . define the essentials of human liberty and
dignity as it should exist-not only for part but for all of society. The
standards [tenative draft] seek to operationalize concepts of justice, of
fairness, and of human rights. 4 3 Accordingly, the tenative draft begins
with the general principle: "Prisoners retain all the rights of free citizens
the privacy of decent people by a proven sex deviate, who, for aught we know, by
marriage while in prison, might have an opportunity to procreate and sire one who
might be like father like son ..
Id. at 1029.
38. 414 U.S. 1148 (1974).
39. Id. at 1150.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 3.
43. Id. at 378.
[Vol. 12:443
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except those on which restriction is necessary to assure their orderly con-
finement or to provide reasonable protection for the rights and physical
safety of all members of the prison community."" Typifying this state-
ment, the draft proposed that inmates not be deprived of the right to
contract or dissolve marriage. 5
Likewise, the second tenative draft of the Uniform Corrections Act pre-
pared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws calls for a change from the current position on many prisoner rights.
The tenative draft proposes that the inmate retain, "all rights political,
personal, civil, and otherwise, including the right to. . .(8) marry, sepa-
rate, divorce ...."I'
Granting the right to marry to inmates naturally raises questions of the
effect the ensuing marriages would have on such collateral areas as conju-
gal visits, divorce and charges of discrimination by homosexuals.
Conjugal visits would not have to be afforded in order to consummate
the marriage. It is uniformly held that consummation through sexual inter-
course or cohabitation is not a requirement of a valid marriage ceremony. 7
Once the ceremony is concluded the parties have entered into the legal
relationship of husband and wife. Furthermore, the courts have held that
denial of conjugal rights to convicted detainees is within the state's power
and does not violate the constitutional rights of the inmate or the spouse.'
Affording the inmate the right to marry would not affect the existing
divorce laws. In many states the conviction and incarceration for a crime
after the marriage is grounds for divorce." However, if the spouse was
convicted of a crime before the marriage and the other spouse knew of the
conviction prior to the marriage ceremony, the conviction is not grounds
for divorce."
44. Id. at 387.
45. Id. at 415.
46. Uniform Corrections Act § 4-600 (2d Tent. Draft 1977).
47. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 262 Ala. 114, 77 So.2d 373, 374 (1955); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 136 Me. 406, 11 A.2d 898, 906 (1940); In re Zanfino's Estate, 375 Pa. 501, 100 A.2d
60, 61 (1953).
48. See, e.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975) (prisoner); Tarlton
v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971) (prisoner); Polakoff
v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1973); aff'd, 488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974)
(prisoner or spouse); In re Flowers, 292 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Wisc. 1968) (prisoner).
49. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(3) (Repl. Vol. 1975). See also Plotkin, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Prisoners' Rights, 11 Cram. L. BuLL. 405, 431 (1975).
50. Caswell v. Caswell, 64 Vt. 557, 24 A. 988 (1892); cf. Williamson v. Williamson, 212 Ark.
12, 204 S.W.2d 785 (1947); Clough v. Clough, 248 Iowa 1090, 84 N.W.2d 16 (1957).
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Granting the right to enter into heterosexual marriages would not open
the door for homosexual marriages. By definition and statute marriage can
be entered into only by persons of the opposite sex. 5' Accordingly, courts
have relied on the very definition of marriage to defeat challenges that
bans on like sex marriages were unconstitutional.2 Of course, should a
state allow civilian homosexual marriages, then a charge of discrimination
may be valid if heterosexual inmate marriages were allowed and homosex-
ual inmate marriages denied."
Thus, recognition of an inmate's right to marry would not affect the
current status of any of these collateral areas.
I. JURISDICTIONS CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF INMATE MARRIAGES
Not only has case law been unable to resolve the issue of a prisoner's
right to marry, there exists no uniform position among the various jurisdic-
tions on this issue.54 (See table below.) In fact, some states have conflicting
positions within their own corrections systems,55 and at least one jurisdic-
51. BALLENTINE'S LAW DIcrIONARY 778 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th ed.
1968); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1384 (1971). See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-45.2 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
52. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.
App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
53. See generally TIME, September 8, 1975, at 35 pertaining to six legally sanctioned homo-
sexual civilian marriages. See also M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert.
denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976) (dealing with sex changes).
54. In December 1976, the Board of Corrections, as rule and policy making body for the
Department of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Virginia created the Chaplaincy Study
Commission. This Commission sought input from the other forty-nine states, the District of
Columbia, and the United States Department of Justice regarding several issues including
their positions on marriage rights of penal inmates. With the permission and assistance of
Hullihen W. Moore, LL.B., Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent and Chappell, Richmond, Va.,
Doris R. DeHart, Chairman, Virginia Board of Corrections and Rev. George F. Ricketts,
Executive Director, Chaplain Service of the Churches of Virginia, a comparative analysis has
been compiled of the various responding jurisdictions' policies on this issue. This research
was supplemented with the state code provisions, if any, of the seventeen states that did not
respond to the Commission's request and interviews with the authorities from several of the
responding states. Any conflicts and duplications in categorizing the jurisdictions are caused
by a difference between the formal position and the actual application of that position. The
non-responding states are Ala., Ark., Colo., Idaho, Ind., Ky., Minn., Miss., Mo., Nev., N.H.,
N.J., Ore., R.I., S.C., S.D., and W.Va. The corresponding chart summarizes the various
jurisdicitions as to their positions, purported and actual, with regard to this issue.
55. For example, an inmate's chance of an approved marriage request in Maryland and
Iowa may depend on whether his or her religious preference is Catholicism: "The Catholic
Chaplain at the Maryland Penitentiary . . .discourages marriages . . .[while] the Protes-
tant Chaplain does allow or seeks permission for them in special circumstances and according
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tion questions whether this issue is important enough to merit concern."
At least twenty-six jurisdictions5l have a formal written policy on inmate
marriages, while eleven states" have none. Six states 9 are governed by a
specific state code or statutory provision. Less than one-third of the United
States jurisdictions generally allow inmate marriages, and of these, only
three-California, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee-view inmate marriages
as a right.'
The second tenative draft of the Uniform Corrections Act would allow
inmates to retain the right to marry.' California and four other states 2
allow inmate marriages without the necessity of an official issuing ap-
proval. Illinois allows "marriages under all circumstances if they meet the
legal requirements of the State. . . .-13 Michigan feels that inmates should
"be permitted to marry if they comply with the law. . . ."I' New York is
in accord except for a statute which prohibits marriage to those sentenced
to life terms," while an Oregon statute provides for no loss of civil rights
to the inmate's religious convictions as well as civil laws." Letter from Frederick E. Terrinoni,
Dir. of Classification, Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Serv. to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (June 3, 1977); "My practice at present is to simply say 'no'. .. The Rules of the
Catholic Church would not permit me to have a marriage in prison at any rate. . . ." Memo
from Iowa Catholic Chaplain Fr. Hoenig to Chaplain Ray, How I HANDLE REQUEST FOR MAR-
RIAGE HERE IN PRISON (May 19, 1977).
56. In an interview on Sept. 16, 1977, Comm'r C. Murray Henderson, Tenn. Dep't. of
Corrections, summed up his philosophy by stating:
What's the big deal? What's the difference? We only have one or two marriage requests
per month out of six thousand inmates, and I don't have the right to deny a person
the right to marry. If there's some compelling interest we may try to talk them out of
it, but if we can't do it, well, so what?
57. Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Ran., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Neb.,
N.Y., N.C., Pa., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Utah, U.S., Va., Wash., Wis.
58. Alas., Ariz., Hawaii, Me., Mont., N.M., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Vt., Wyo.
59. Cal., Idaho, Mo., Ore., R.I., Tex.
60. "[Ejach such person shall have the following civil rights . . .(f) To marry." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2601(f) (Deering 1975); "By law all inmates shall be granted all fundamental
constitutional rights enjoyed by the general population . . . ." Pa. Bureau of Correction,
Directive, INMATE MARRIAGES (Nov. 7, 1974); "Thus, marriage seems to be a right which isn't
removed upon conviction of a felony." Letter from C. Murray Henderson, Comm'r, Tenn.
Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (Apr. 25, 1977).
61. Uniform Corrections Act (2d Tent. Draft), Nat'l. Conf. of Comm'rs. on Uniform State
Laws (1977).
62. Ill., Mich., N.Y., Ore.
63. Letter from Charles J. Rowe, Acting Dir., Ill. Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (May 11, 1977).
64. Mich. Dep't of Corrections, Policy Directive DWA-64.03, RIGHTS OF CLIENTs TO RESPON-
SIBLE SELF-DETERMINATION (1977).
65. N.Y. Dep't of Correctional Serv., Directive No. 4201, MARRIAGES DURING CONFINEMENT
(Jan. 15, 1975)
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due to imprisonment. " Texas law allows proxy marriages," and inmates
who choose this route cannot be barred or hampered by prison officials;"8
otherwise, it is difficult for a Texas penal inmate to marry."9
Closely aligned with the states that allow inmate marriages are eight
jurisdictions 0 that seem to generally approve requests by inmates to
marry. Louisiana's formal position places it in this category,7 but its ac-
tual policy is to "allow inmates to be married, but only in very special
circumstances."72 The District of Columbia's official policy statement in-
tones that, "when all legal and procedural criteria have been met, it is the
Department's policy to permit its residents to marry."73 But a closer look
at the District's policy seems to limit authorization to situations involving
children or where incarceration thwarted a previous agreement to marry. 74
Although the Tennessee and Pennsylvania philosophies are most favorable
to inmate marriages, they refuse to give carte blanche approval to all
marriage requests.75 Oklahoma grants inmates the privilege of marriage, 76
Any inmate may marry providing: a. there are no legal impedements to such marriage, b.
satisfactory arrangements can be made. . . . Section 79-a of the New York State Civil Rights
Law prohibits an offender sentenced to life imprisonment from entering into marriage until
such time as he is paroled.
66. ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.275 (1975). Available information does not disclose how close
Oregon policy follows this statute.
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.05 (Vernon 1975); See also Op. ATr'y. GEN. TEX. No.
M-1287 (Dec. 28, 1972): "We therefore conclude that a proxy marriage may be performed in
Texas."
68. "We have nothing to say about who are married by proxy .... We will simply be
notified when the proxy marriage has been consummated [?] and we change our records."
Letter from Clyde M. Johnston, Dir. of Chaplains, Tex. Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy
Study Comm'n (May 25, 1977).
69. Id. "We do not encourage inmate marriages."
70. Conn., D.C., La., Okla., Pa., Tenn., U.S., Wis.
71. "Absent unusual circumstances, the warden should approve the marriage request." La.
Dep't of Corrections, Dep't Reg. No. 30-23, INMATE MARRIAGE REQUESTS (Apr. 21, 1976).
72. Letter from C. Paul Phelps, Sec. of Corrections, La. Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy
Study Comm'n (Apr. 19, 1977).
73. D. C. Dep't of Corrections, Dep't Order No. 4160.5, MARRIAGE BY RESmENrTS OF THE D.
C. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (Dec. 30, 1976).
74. Id. "6. Purpose of Marriage While Incarcerated: Authorization will be considered for
the following purposes: a) Pregnancy; b) Previously arranged marriage prevented by arrest
and incarceration; c) To legalize a sound relationship of significant duration, particularly
when children are involved."
75. "The warden does, however, retain the option of denying or delaying a request, and
this action has been used in two requests [since the Dep't's policy was liberalized on April
30, 1976]." Letter from C. Murray Henderson (supra note 60); Pa. Bureau of Corrections,
Directive, INMATE MARRIAGES, (Nov. 7, 1974) "Permission will not be granted if the inmate's
mental or emotional stability will be seriously impaired by the marriage."
76. "[We take an active interest in the desire of an inmate to become married .... This
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while Connecticut and Wisconsin pose no unnecessary restraints so long
as statutory77 and procedural" requirements are met.
There has been a growing progressive attitude towards prisoners' rights
since the days of Andersonville. 9 Recognizing the trend, the United States
Department of Justice expresses its tolerance of inmate marriages as fol-
lows: "Formerly an inmate had to convince the staff of the institution
where confined that the marriage was necessary and/or helpful. Now the
responsibility is on the staff to give sufficient evidence why the marriage
may not be consummated [emphasis added]."80
Most jurisdictions' favoring inmate marriages claim a neutral or open
policy on the issue either in written correspondence 2 or in their formal
rules and regulations. This contention can be somewhat deceptive as evi-
denced by Delaware's allegedly open policy" and Virginia's claim of neu-
trality. Actually, Virginia makes it very difficult for an inmate to marry,"
while the anomaly of Delaware's claim of an open policy is brought out in
an inter-departmental memorandum: "It [the present procedure] was
developed some years ago by a former chaplain (now deceased) who, with
the institutional officials, was apparently in basic opposition to marriages
of inmates but felt that one might be permitted under very exceptional
circumstances. The present feeling is the same." 8
privilege is not spoken by statute." Letter from Frederick L. Keith, Dir. Programs and Serv.
Unit Okla. Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (May 3, 1977).
77. "The Department of Correction is neutral in the marriage area so long as the statutory
requirements (blood tests, parental consent, etc.) are met." Letter from Dorin J. Povani, Dep.
Comm'r for Evaluation and Inspection, Conn. Dep't of Correction to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (Apr. 18, 1977); Accord, Wis. Admin. Policies, Div. of Corrections, Sect. No. 3.006,
RESIDENT MARRIAGE (May 15, 1977).
78. Conn. Admin. Directive, Dep't of Correction, Ch. No. 1.3, INMATE MARRAGES (Dec. 1,
1976); Wis. Admin. Policies, Div. of Corrections Sect. No. 3.006. RESWRrr MARRIAGES (May
15, 1977).
79. Andersonville, Ga., was the site of a notorious prison for Union soldiers during the Civil
War. C. Funk, NEW COLLEGE STANDARD DICTIONARY 45 (1947).
80. Letter from Norman A. Carlson, Dir., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons to
Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (May 2, 1977). See also Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights
Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RicH. L. Rav. 803, 851-52 (1977).
81. Cal., Conn., Mich., N.Y., Pa., Tenn., U.S.
82. Letters to Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (1977), supra note 54.
83. Letter from Rev. Don Chapman, Chaplain, Del. Correctional Center to Chaplaincy
Study Comm'n (April 25, 1977).
84. Div. of Adult Serv. Guideline, Va. Dep't of Corrections, No. 891, MARRIAGE CEREMONIES
FOR INMATES (May 19, 1976).
85. Interview with George F. Ricketts, Exec. Dir., Chaplain Serv. of the Churches of Va.
(Sept. 19, 1977).
86. Memo from E. H. Dunlavey to Comm'r Vaughan, MARRIAGE BY INMATES, (Apr. 22,
1977). See also, Letter from Rev. Don Chapman, supra note 83. "While meeting with each
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Nebraska's seemingly neutral official position"7 is contrasted in practice
with a negative stance which discourages and seldom allows inmates to
marry." A Nebraska inmate seeking permission to marry because of a
pregnant consort is first told that "the possibility of marriage is rather
remote," 9 and then is introduced to "forms. . .called 'Paternity Affida-
vits' . . . for the birth record. . . having the inmate's name as father of
the child."9
Over half the states take a moderate to strong stand in opposition to
prisoner marriages. In at least seven states they are simply not allowed.'
By statute, Idaho, Missouri, and Rhode Island declare that a prisoner loses
his civil rights upon incarceration,92 and is civilly dead if sentenced to life
imprisonment. 3 Arizona has retreated from allowing inmate marriages "on
a very rare occasion" to a present interim policy. . . "which does not allow
an individual on inmate status authorization to get married ...
[pending] result of litigation in the United States District Court."94 Geor-
gia has but one narrow exception to its prohibition of inmate marriages;
they are "only allowed if an unwed mother conceived prior to an inmate's
incarceration."9 Iowa, by allowing only a single marriage in the last twelve
years,9 in effect, has a negative policy. The unwritten policy of the Ohio 7
inmate, I have explained the institution's procedure. Usually this has discouraged the inmate
from further pursuing an institutional marriage. My personal feeling is not to encourage such
a marriage as well."
87. Neb. Div. of Corrections, Official Memo. No. 839.001, OFFENDER MAIRAGES (Mar. 22,
1976).
88. "[H]e [the warden] and I agreed that inmate marriages should not be allowed."
Letter from Winfred C. Ollenburg, Chaplain, Neb. Dep't of Corrections to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (Apr. 20, 1977).
89. Id.
90. Id. No information is available as to whether any of these confession-obligation forms
have ever been executed by an inmate.
91. Ariz., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, N.D., Ohio, R.I.
92. IDAHO CODE § 18-310 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (Vernon 1959); R.
I. GEN. LAws § 13-6-1 (1969).
93. IDAHO CODE § 18-311 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (Vernon 1959); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 13-6-2 (1969).
94. Letter from Thomas W. Korff, Ass't to the Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Corrections to Chap-
laincy Study Comm'n (May 10, 1977). This pending litigation involves a prospective spouse
claiming a violation of her civil rights because she was not allowed to marry an inmate.
Interview with Thomas W. Korff, Ass't to the Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Corrections (Sept. 6, 1977).
See note 33 supra and accompanying text for Utah case on point.
95. Ga. Dep't of Offender Rehab., Dep'tal Rules and Regs. Ch. 125-2-2-.14 MARRIAGE,
AMENDED (Feb. 16, 1975).
96. Letter from Sherburne L. Ray, Religious Coordinator, Iowa State Pen. to Chaplaincy
Study Comm'n (May 27, 1977).
97. "The general policy of our Department is not to permit marriages." Letter from Freder-
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and North Dakota18 prison administrators is not to permit inmates to
marry.
Seven states" claim to strongly discourage requests by prisoners to
marry. While Montana's "general policy discourages marriage of inmates
in prison,"' 1 most of these discouragements come directly from the chap-
lains. The Delaware chaplain claims his meeting with inmates requesting
to be married "usually . . .has discouraged the inmate from further
pursuing an institutional marriage."' 10 Florida's chaplains are "the most
frequent marriage counselors and they are urged to lead inmates to
responsibility in the matter. Sometimes, responsibility leads to inmates
deciding that marriage is not the best decision [emphasis added]. ' '"10
While the Iowa and Maine chaplains flatly claim to "discourage marriage"
during imprisonment,"3 the Nebraska chaplain takes a more subtle ap-
proach. He writes a letter to every prospective civilian spouse which in-
cludes a sentence which states something to the effect that if we allow or
ever recommend this marriage, we would possibly be guilty of contributing
to what has already been an irresponsible life pattern."'' At least one of
these chaplains feels "[t]here is no legal prohibition to marriage while in
jail. [And concedes] I suppose that an inmate could insist and his request
would have to be granted."'905 This policy of strong discouragement appears
to be serving its purpose since "so far, these decisions have been accepted
without any recourse for some kind of an appeal."''
ick R. Silber, Chaplain, Adm'r., Religious Serv., Ohio Dep't of Rehab. and Correction to
Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (May 4, 1977); Answering an informal inquiry, an Ohio "Federal
Judge indicated marriage was not a Constitutional right, and, therefore, the denial of mar-
riage was not a violation of the rights of the individual. Further, he intimated should a case
be brought before him, he would uphold the practice of the Department." Id. Contra, note
60.
98. North Dakota's "present administration's policy [is] not to allow any marriages while
an inmate is serving a sentence in the Penitentiary." Letter from Charles F. Enders, Dir. of
Programs, N.D. State Pen. to Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (Apr. 25, 1977). To make sure there
was no misunderstanding, Mr. Enders closed this letter with "We do not allow inmate mar-
riages." Id.
99. Del., Fla., Iowa, Me., Md., Mont., Neb.
100. Letter from Alvin 0. Skibsrud, Chaplain, Mont. State Prison to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (May 6, 1977).
101. Letter from Rev. Don Chapman, supra note 83.
102. Letter from Hugh D. Perry, Fla. Chaplaincy Serv. Coordinator to Chaplaincy Study
Comm'n (Apr. 20, 1977).
103. Letter from Sherburne L. Ray, supra note 96; Letter from T. Lawrence Gilbert, Jr.,
D. Min., Dir. of Pastoral Care, Me. Correctional Center to Chaplaincy Study Comm'n (May
3, 1977).
104. Letter from Winfred C. Ollenburg, supra note 88.
105. Letter from T. Lawrence Gilbert, Jr., supra note 103.
106. Letter from Winfred C. Ollenburg, supra note 88.
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Virginia and at least twelve other states"°7 seem to either generally disap-
prove or give only limited approval to requests by prisoners to marry. New
Mexico will only allow such marriages by proxy,'08 but contrary to Texas,
these proxy marriages are discretionary and not absolute privileges af-
forded by statute.' 9 In 1974, Washington "vacillated from not permitting
marriages under any circumstances to a more liberal policy [which still
requires] a strong presentation for granting permission to marry . .. .""'
Three states-Florida, " Kansas, " and North Carolina"t3-along with the
more neutral state of Maryland,"' give special consideration to inmates
who are soon to be released, or who have earned special privileges by
participation in an outside rehabilitating activity such as a work or study
release program. Eleven jurisdictions"' also give extra consideration to
those cases where pregnancy is involved or where a previously born child
will be legitimized by the requested marriage. There appears to be no rule
of thumb permitting one to predict whether a marriage request will be
approved in six states."' Virginia typifies this ad hoc, discretionary ap-
proach with a policy of judging each case "on its individual merits, taking
into account the parties, their relationship prior to incarceration, their
financial assets, the public interest, and all other pertinent considera-
tions."" 7
From the available information, over seventy-five percent of the jurisdic-
tions require an official decision to be made on each inmate's request to
marry. The warden or penal institution head makes the final determina-
tion in fifteen jurisdictions;"' the head of the department of corrections in
107. Del., Fla., Kan., La., Me., Mont., Neb., N.M., N.C., Tex., Wash., Wyo.
108. Letter from Edwin T. Mahr, Sec'y of Corrections, N.M. Dep't of Corrections to Chap-
laincy Study Comm'n (Apr. 25, 1977).
109. Id.
110. Letter from Roger Maxwell, Ass't Dir., Wash. Adult Corrections Div. to Chaplaincy
Study Comm'n (Apr. 22, 1977).
111. Fla. Dep't of Offender Rehab., Program Directive No. 9, MARRIAGE OF AN INMATE
WHILE INCARCERATED (n.d.).
112. Kan. Dep't of Corrections, Pol'y and Procedure Manual, II Inmate Mgmt., Sec. No.
212, MARRIAGE POLICY FOR INMATES (Feb. 1, 1977).
113. N.C. Dep't of Corrections, Tab No. 5NCAC2F, INMATE MARRIAGE REQUESTS (Feb. 1,
1976).
114. "An inmate housed in a minimum security institution, in a community corrections
center, or in the Work Release Program would be in a much better position for a favorable
response to a request ...." Letter from Frederick E. Terrinoni, supra note 55.
115. D.C., Fla., Ga., Kan., Mass., Mont., Neb., N.M., N.C., Tex., Wyo.
116. Hawaii, Md., Mass., Utah, Vt., Va.
117. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84.




seven jurisdictions;"' the chaplain in two jurisdictions;'," and a committee
in two jurisdictions.'"' Maryland's penal classification director indicates
that "the Warden. . . makes the final decision,"1 2  while Maryland's for-
mal written policy provision is that the "Commissioner of Correction
makes the final decision with the warden's report.' 'I If the final decision
is in favor of marriage, only seven jurisdictions 2 seem to give consideration
to a furlough to allow the ceremony outside the penal setting.
The majority of prison chaplains seem to feel approval of marriage under
the basically abnormal environment of prison conditions "does a disservice
to the individual inmate by limitation of choice [of partners] and by
virtue of making a decision for reasons that suit the confinement situation
rather than promote a stable marriage situation."' ' Based on both per-
sonal and religious beliefs, the general opinion seems to be that "the time
of incarceration is just no occasion to get married."' 26 In respecting the
religious convictions of their chaplains, three states'2 recognize the posi-
tion taken by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons,
that "a Chaplain is not forced to perform a marriage against his consci-
ence."12
119. Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Mass., Pa., Tex., Vt., Va.
120. Me., Ohio.
121. Del., Utah.
122. Letter from Frederick E. Terrinoni, supra note 55.
123. Md. Div. of Correction Reg. No. 265-1, REQUEST TO MARRY (Mar. 22, 1974).
124. Conn., Ill., Kan., Neb., N.Y., U.S., Wash.
125. Memo from Walter L. Kautzky, N.C. Dep. Dir. of the Div. of Prisons, RIGHTS OF
INMATES TO MARRY (May 21, 1974). The position of the Chaplain Service of the Churches of
Virginia, Inc., favoring inmate marriages is in direct conflict with the majority of other prison
chaplains.
I know of no reason why an inmate should be denied the opportunity to marry if he or
she meets the requirements of the state to obtain a marriage license. It would appear
to me that the public interest in the marriage of an inmate is no different than the
public interest in other marriages.
Letter from George F. Ricketts, Exec. Dir., Chaplain Service of the Churches of Virginia, Inc.,
to Bishop John Baden (May 3, 1976).
126. Interview with Frederick R. Silber, Chaplain, Adm'r, Religious Serv., Ohio Dep't of
Rehab. and Correction (Sept. 6, 1977).
127. "A prison chaplain lawfully may refuse to solemnize an inmate marriage ... when
to do so would violate his religious beliefs." Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. No. CV 76/58 I.L. (Jan. 3,
1977); "The Department position is that our paid chaplains do not have to perform marriages
. ." Mich. Dep't of Corrections, Pol'y Directive DWN-64.03, RIGHT OF CLIENTS TO RESPON-
SIBLE SELF-DETERMINATION, (n.d.). "Under no circumstances will any chaplain be required to
perform a marriage he feels is not in the best interest of both parties." Tenn. Dep't of
Corrections, Policy Memo, No. 56, MARRIAGE OF INMATES (Apr. 30, 1976).
128. Letter from Norman A. Carlson, Dir., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bur. of Prisons to Chap-
laincy Study Comm'n (May 2, 1977).
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An examination of the jurisdictions reveals a general lack of consistency
and a menagerie of divergent, often contradictory positions.
IV. A CLOSER INSPECTION OF ONE STATE JURISDICTION: AN INMATE'S RIGI-f
TO MARRIAGE IN VIRGINIA
A close look at Virginia's formal policy reveals that considerable effort
and thought have gone into this area. Despite its procedural thoroughness,
however, Virginia's policy is constructed so that the ultimate determina-
tion of an inmate's marriage request usually depends upon the personal
philosophy of the current Director of the Department of Corrections. The
Directors' past exercise of discretion has not favored inmate marriages., 9
There are no Virginia statutes relating to the area of prisoners' mar-
riages. The Commonwealth is guided by the Department of Correction's
most recent policy statement.'10
The present guideline establishes the specific procedures to be followed
by an inmate in gaining approval for his proposed marriage, as well as the
post approval measures necessary to enable the ceremony to take place.
The Department takes a cautious view of inmate marriages.' The policy
statement contends that although there are many aspects of such mar-
riages that are helpful in preparing the inmate for release, there are harm-
ful aspects that also must be considered.'32 The statement further estab-
lishes that each request is to be considered on its individual merits in
relation to certain enumerated considerations.' 3  It also points out that the
approval of a marriage request will not necessarily benefit the inmate with
regard to his opportunity for parole, furlough, transfer, or other such con-
siderations.'34 Under the Commonwealth's present policy, the burden is on
the inmate to demonstrate his need to be married while incarcerated as
opposed to waiting for discharge or parole. 3 5
The present guideline outlines the procedure to be followed in submit-
ting and determining the inmate's marital request. The initial step con-
sists of the inmate's submitting a written request to the superintendent of
129. Interview with Rev. George F. Ricketts, supra note 85.
130. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84. The present policy superseded Guideline Number
803 which had been in effect since Mar. 5, 1974.
131. "Extremely careful consideration must be given all requests for the marriage of an
inmate." Id. at 1.
132. Id. at 1. However, specific harmful responsibilities of such marriages are not cited.
133. Id. These considerations include "the welfare of the inmate and the proposed spouse,





his institution, who then assigns a staff member to assist the inmate in
reducing all necessary information to writing.' 3' With the inmate's written
approval, the staff member then meets with the proposed spouse and thor-
oughly reviews the inmate's record file.'37 After this review has taken place,
the complete written request is submitted to the superintendent of the
inmate's institution.'
38
The superintendent consults the chaplain assigned to the inmate's insti-
tution'39 regarding the advisability of permitting the inmate to marry.'40
The superintendent, taking into account the chaplain's recommendation,
then makes his own written recommendation and forwards it along with
the inmate's request, to the Director, Division of Adult Services, "' who
considers the request and recommendation(s), and if he deems it benefi-
cial, institutes further investigation. "2 On the basis of this information, if
he feels that a favorable recommendation can be given to the proposed
marriage, the recommendation is forwarded along with the recommenda-
tions of the superintendent and chaplain, the inmate's request, and all
data gathered from an investigation to the Director of the Department of
Corrections.'
The Director of the Department of Corrections has final authority to
136. Id. at. 1-2. According to the guideline, the staff member, presumably a counselor, is
to remain neutral in regard to the request.
Besides aiding the inmate with background information, the staff member also helps the
inmate prepare a statement which persuasively presents the inmate's reasoning as to why he
should be married while incarcerated.
137. Id. at 2. Apparently, the Commonwealth assumes that there is a substantial possibil-
ity that the inmate has not divulged his entire criminal history and all other salient details
(such as possibility of parole) to his intended spouse. It is interesting to note that the inmate
does not have access to this file himself. Interview with Rev. George F. Ricketts, supra note
85.
138. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84.
139. The chaplains who serve the Commonwealth's penal institutions are supplied by the
Chaplain Service of the Churches of Virginia. The Chaplain Service is a private, non-profit
religious organization which operates autonomously from the Department of Corrections. The
Department has utilized the service since 1920, and over the years the Chaplain Service has
become the coordinator of religious activities for Virginia's inmates. The service presently has
nine full-time and approximately seven part-time chaplains assigned to the Commonwealth's
penal facilities. These persons are not on the state payroll. Interview with Rev. George F.
Ricketts, supra note 85.
140. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84.
141. Id. at 2. The chaplain, if he feels it necessary and appropriate, may submit his
separate recommendation to the Director, Division of Adult Services, under separate cover.
142. The investigation is to concern "the backgrounds of the parties, the request and effect
a marriage would have on the parties and on the public interest." Id.
143. Id.
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approve or disapprove all requests submitted to him.' Under the present
policy when the request is disapproved, it is possible to resubmit the re-
quest after passage of one year provided some fact or circumstance has
changed which would indicate that the request could be approved." 5 There
is also a provision which allows any request not recommended by the
Director, Division of Adult Services, to be appealed directly to the Director
of the Department of Corrections."'
Further provisions provide that, should the marriage be approved, the
inmate must submit a copy of the marriage license'47 and the blood test
results' to the superintendent before a ceremony can take place.'"9 The
inmate must also agree to counseling sessions "to such a degree as may be
appropriate"'' 0 by the institutional chaplain while incarcerated and upon
release.'5 ' It is further required that the ceremony be held at the inmate's
institution,'5 2 unless arrangements are made for the ceremony to take place
during an approved furlough.' 3 The inmate is fully responsible for all
expenses incurred.'54
While Virginia's present policy appears to be neutral on its face, as a
practical matter very few inmate marriages are approved." In fact, there
144. Id. According to the guidelines, the Director of the Department of Corrections is to
consider each case individually taking into account "the parties, their relationship prior to
incarceration, their financial assets, the public interest, and all other pertinent considera-
tions." Id. at 2-3. These considerations are not elaborated on in any detail. The consideration
of the inmate's financial assets seems dubious at best, and there are some persons who feel
that the purpose of such is the Commonwealth's interest in minimizing welfare benefits paid
out. Interview with Rev. George F. Ricketts, supra note 85.
145. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84. No specific examples are cited.
146. Id. at 3.
147. In Virginia, only one party to the proposed marriage need appear before the county
clerk, provided there is a notarized affidavit from the absent party indicating his background
and intent to marry. Interview with Rev. George F. Ricketts, supra note 85.
148. The blood test can be performed by the institution's health office. Id.
149. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84.
150. No explanation of this vague phrase is given.
151. Id. at 3. No indication is given concerning whether these sessions are prerequisites to
having the actual ceremony take place. The required session upon release is especially trou-
blesome, i.e., if the inmate refuses such counseling is his marriage invalidated and possibly
his parole cancelled?
152. All arrangements for the ceremony are made by the staff member originally assigned
to the inmate provided they meet with the superintendent's approval. Id.
153. Id. In the absence of a furlough, no opportunity is provided for the marriage to be
consummated. Virginia is not among the jurisdictions that allow conjugal visits. Interview
with Rev. George F. Ricketts, supra note 85.
154. Guideline No. 891, supra note 84.




has been a considerable decline in approvals since the present policy has
been in effect.' Among the reasons given for the decline are increased red
tape, an increased burden on the inmate to show legitimate reasons to be
married, and a general prohibitive attitude on the part of the department's
administrators.' New regulations should be considered in an effort to
introduce equity into the area of inmate marriages.
V. A PROPOSED REGULATION FOR VIRGINIA ON INMATE MARRIAGES
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this regulation is to establish guidelines for the marriages
of inmates. The Commonwealth recognizes the right to marry as funda-
mental and that inmates are granted all fundamental constitutional rights
enjoyed by the general population that are not inconsistent with imprison-
ment itself. The Commonwealth is not only charged with protecting the
rights and welfare of the inmate and his intended spouse, but also has a
responsibility for insuring the general welfare and safety of the institu-
tional community, as well as society at large. Thus, all of these interests
are of vital importance in considering an inmate's request to marry. It is
recognized that a major objective of the Department of Corrections is to
foster ties to the community that will help create stability in the inmate's
personal life, and that in many cases, the marriage relationship can be
beneficial in preparing the inmate for his release and reassimilation into
the community.
II. GENERAL GUIDELINES
A. Every inmate (except as limited by Guidelines C, D, and E below)
has the right to seek approval for a proposed marriage through the proper
procedures outlined herein.
B. Each request shall be considered individually on its own merits by
the Marital Evaluation Committee (described below). This Committee has
final authority with regard to the request's ultimate disposition.
C. If parole or pre-release status is imminent (within six months), an
inmate who has attained such status cannot be denied the right to marry
while incarcerated. However, the inmate should be counseled as to the
156. As a practical matter, under the previous policy, Guideline No. 803, the superintend-
ent's recommendation was routinely the only requirement in having the request approved.
The other officials in the process generally deferred to his judgment. This is no longer true
under the present policy. Id.
157. Id.
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advisability of deferring the marriage until such status is attained. Since
in these cases the right to marry is automatic, the procedure outlined below
is not applicable.
D. No marriage shall be denied, regardless of the inmate's status,
where the purpose of such marriage is the legitimation and support of
children born or about to be born. The procedure outlined below is not
applicable in such cases.
E. An offender sentenced to life imprisonment shall be prohibited from
entering into marriage until such time as he has attained parole status.
Guideline D creates an exception whereby this prohibition shall be waived.
F. Approval will not be granted if the marriage would be void under
the laws of the Commonwealth; e.g., bigamy, incest, non-age marriage,
marriages lacking requisite parental consent, marriages between persons
of the same sex, or marriages of emotionally and mentally imcompetent
persons.
G. All statutory requirements, such as the medical tests and licensing
procedures, must be met before the ceremony is performed.
H. The marriages involving an inmate shall take place within the insti-
tution where the inmate is incarcerated or in a place approved by the
institutional superintendent and shall be solemnized by either the institu-
tional chaplain, an outside recognized clergyperson chosen by the appli-
cants, or by a judge or justice of the peace. This does not apply to inmates
who have achieved a status, such as furlough, whereby they can be freely
married outside the institution.
I. The inmate himself is responsible for all financial obligations in-
curred. State funds shall not be appropriated for such use.
J. It should be emphasized to the inmate that the fact of a marriage
of this type will not be of any benefit for purposes of parole, furlough,
transfer, or other considerations.
III. PROCEDURE FOR THE INMATE'S MARITAL REQUEST
A. Notice of Intent to Marry
1. A written request for marriage must be filed notifying the superin-
tendent of the inmate's institution of the parties' intent to marry. Such
request must be signed by both the inmate and the intended spouse to
insure mutual agreement.
2. Upon receipt, the superintendent shall assign an appropriate
staff member (e.g., an institutional counselor) to process the request. The
latter shall assist the inmate in reducing to writing all necessary informa-
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tion, including background data of both the inmate and the intended
spouse. The staff member's position throughout the procedure should be
neutral. It is not his job to encourage or discourage the proposed marriage.
However, he does have a vote with regard to the request's final determina-
tion as a member of the Marital Evaluation Committee. (See Guideline
D.2. below).
B. Interviews with the Proposed Marriage Partners
1. The staff member shall have an interview with the inmate submit-
ting the request, and shall fully explain the mechanics and details of the
entire marriage approval procedure. It should be pointed out to the in-
mate that while the Department will assist in areas where capable, the
responsibility for actual execution of the procedures rests with the inmate
and intended spouse.
2. The staff member shall also have an interview with the intended
spouse. Full disclosure of the inmate's record, including a summary of the
inmate's salient criminal history is required. The inmate must personally
approve, in writing, the divulgence of this information. If such approval is
not forthcoming, the marriage request will be tabled at this point. Such
details as parole eligibility, conditional discharge, and the maximum expi-
ration date of the inmate's sentence must be provided the intended spouse.
It should also be explained that no special consideration for temporary
release or parole will be accorded the inmate by benefit of the marriage.
3. If both the inmate and intended spouse desire counseling, the
institutional chaplain of their faith shall be available. Such a consultation
should be strongly urged.
C. Recommendations
1. Separate, written recommendations regarding the advisability of
the requested marriage shall be submitted to the Marital Evaluation Com-
mittee by the superintendent of the inmate's institution, the chaplain
assigned to that institution, and the assigned staff member.
D. The Marital Evaluation Committee
1. The purpose of such Committee shall be to give individual consid-
eration to each request. The Committee is required to make a final deter-
mination on the inmate's request within 60 days after it's submission to
the inmate's superintendent.
2. The Committee shall consist of seven members; four shall hold
permanent positions, and three shall vary depending on the inmate's insti-
tution. The permanent members shall include the Director, Division of
Adult Services, who shall serve as chairperson, and three citizens ap-
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pointed by the Governor. The members serving on a variable basis shall
be the superintendent and chaplain of the inmate's institution, as well as
the staff member who aided the inmate and intended spouse in prepara-
tion of the request. After a discussion where all recommendations, back-
ground data, and relevant interests (those of the inmate, the intended
spouse, the Commonwealth, and the community) are considered, a vote
shall be taken. Each member casts a single vote, and a simple majority is
required for approval.
3. The burden is on the Committee to establish why the inmate
should not be allowed to marry. If there are insufficient grounds on which
to support a denial, then the marriage should be approved. There is a
presumption that the marriage should be allowed; it is up to the Commit-
tee to establish otherwise.
4. Should the request be denied, a full, documented report explain-
ing the Committee's reasoning must be made available to the inmate and
the intended spouse. An explanation from the chairperson advising the
inmate of the procedure's appeal provisions should be attached.
5. A denied marriage request may be resubmitted after a period of
one year has elapsed provided there has been a significant change in cir-
cumstances (e.g., a change in the inmate's custody classification from
maximum to minimum security).
E. Upon Committee Approval: Meeting the Statutory Requirements
1. The assigned staff member is charged with assisting the parties
in arranging both the requisite blood test and the acquisition of a marriage
license. The former should be arranged with the institution's assigned
health official. The staff member should arrange for the inmate to submit
a notarized affidavit, whereby the intended spouse can obtain the marriage
license.
F. Upon Committee Approval: The Ceremony
1. Arrangements for the ceremony are the responsibility of the in-
mate and intended spouse. The staff member is available to assist however
possible. This may include reserving the institution's chapel, or making
the necessary arrangements for the clergyperson or officer of the couple's
choice.
2. Those permitted to attend the ceremony shall be limited to the
two participating partners, the solemnizer, and four guests of the couple's
choosing. There shall be a one-hour time limit on the chapel's use. Neces-




3. No special privileges, such as a marriage furlough or conjugal
visit, are to be granted solely as a result of the approval to marry, and the
nature of such surrounding activities are contingent upon the custody clas-
sification of the inmate.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are several features in the proposed regulation that clearly distin-
guish it from the present guideline. The proposal is much more detailed
than the present guideline. It establishes policy and procedure in areas
formerly left to discretion. By decreasing the amount of individual discre-
tion, the proposed regulation seeks to reduce the personal arbitrariness and
discrimination presently involved. The proposed procedure also reduces
the red tape involved in the ultimate determination of the request. Under
the proposed regulation, the request would not have to be approved at
every level of the Department of Corrections' bureaucratic stritcture. In
addition, there are inherent benefits involved in a committee determina-
tion as opposed to final authority vested in one decisionmaker. Personal
prejudices are diluted within a committee framework so that individual
bias and discretion are minimized or eliminated. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the burden is shifted to the government for presenting legitimate
reasons for prohibiting the marriage. The comment does not propose that
the right to marry is fundamental for all inmates "across the board."
However, it does propose that marriage is a fundamental right that cannot
be denied unless the government establishes significant, documented
substantiation that the marriage would be materially detrimental to the
interests of the parties, the Commonwealth, or the community at large.
Although judicial decisions have established no clear precedents, the
courts concede that the states have within their police power the right to
deny inmate freedoms that would otherwise be available to unincarcerated
civilians. However, the trend appears to be towards weakening the distinc-
tion between an inmate's rights and those of a civilian. Although the pres-
ent policies of other jurisdictions are muddled, there may be a discernible
trend favoring increased inmate freedoms. It appears the time has come
for Virginia's Department of Corrections to take a more humanistic, realis-
tic view of the sacred institution of marriage.
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1978] PRISON INMATE MARRIAGES 4(
Jurisdictions Purported Policy Actual Policy
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri Not Allowed by Statute. Not Allowed.
27. Montana Discouraged. No Written Generally Not Allowed.
Policy.




32. New Mexico Generally Not Allowed. Generally Not Allowed.
No Written Policy.
33. New York Allowed by Statute, except Allowed except for "lifers."
for "lifers."
34. North Carolina Generally Allowed in Allowed for Specific
Limited Situations. Circumstances. Not
Written Policy. Allowed Otherwise.
35. North Dakota Not Allowed. No Written Not Allowed.
Policy.
36. Ohio Not Allowed. No Written Not Allowed.
Policy.
37. Oklahoma Generally Allowed. No Generally Allowed.
Written Policy.
38. Oregon Allowed by Statute.
39. Pennsylvania Generally Allowed. Written Generally Allowed.
Policy.
40. Rhode Island Not Allowed by Statute. Not Allowed.
41. South Carolina
42. South Dakota
43. Tennessee Generally Allowed. Generally Allowed.
Written Policy.
44. Texas Allowed by Proxy Only. Generally Not Allowed,
Statute. except for Proxy Marriages
45. U.S. Dept. of Neutral. Written Policy. Generally Allowed.
Justice
46. Utah Neutral. Written Policy. Discretionary Decision
on Case-by-Case Basis.
47. Vermont Neutral. No Written Policy. Discretionary Decisions
on Case-by-Case Basis.
48. Virginia Neutral. Written Policy. Generally Not Allowed.















This chart was compiled from information received by the Chaplaincy Study
Commission in answer to its request to the other forty-nine states, the District
of Columbia, and the United States Department of Justice regarding their posi-
tions on marriage rights of penal inmates. This research was supplemented with
the state code provisions of the non-responding states and by interviews with the
authorities from several of the responding jurisdictions.
** No response was received by the Chaplaincy Study Commission to its request
for information from this state regarding its position on marriage rights of penal
inmates; therefore, this jurisdiction's position is unknown.
Jurisdictions
49. Washington
